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Jadaszewski: Milton Rokeach's Experimental Modification of Values

In a 1967 address, Milton Rokeach called for a new direction in social
psychological research - one that took human values as its core research construct.
The occasion for this proposal (a version of which would see print as the
psychologist's first publication on the subject the following year; Rokeach, 1967d,
1968a) was Rokeach's presidential address to the Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). In several ways, this was a high-point in a long
and prolific career for Rokeach. He had served a fruitful term as SPSSI president,
during which he had helped to coordinate such activities as Martin Luther King Jr.'s
(1968) address to the American Psychological Association's annual conference
(King, 1967; Rokeach, 1967a), and was enjoying the success (despite some
controversy) of his then recently-published book The Three Christs of Ypsilanti
(Rokeach, 1964b).
Despite the prominence that he had achieved within social psychology, his
1967 address sought to challenge one of the discipline's core characteristics. From
the beginning of social psychology, attitudes had been understood to be the
discipline's "most distinctive and indispensable concept" (Allport, 1935, p. 798).
To Rokeach, this focus had been misplaced. The predominance of attitudes in the
literature, as he saw it, had produced a social psychology that struggled to offer
practical solutions for the social problems facing the nation and the world, such as
racial and ethnic discrimination, poverty, and war and genocide. In Rokeach's
view, in order for psychologists to provide solutions to such problems, they needed
to develop techniques for affecting change in individuals' belief-systems on a
structural level, and an understanding of human values was key to this endeavor.
Such techniques, he anticipated, could involve humanistically-grounded and noncoercive strategies for affecting individual change and would eventually help to
bring psychologists out of the laboratory and into applied settings where they could
demonstrate their relevance to real-world problems. It would also encourage
interdisciplinary work, serving as a unifying force for the social sciences. Rokeach
would dedicate the ensuing two decades of his career to developing the program of
psychological research that he had proposed in this speech. This effort would not
only require new research tools and techniques, but would also draw renewed
attention to considerations related to the ethical obligations and social role of
researchers in the field of psychology.
Background and Early Career
Milton Rokeach was born Mendel Rokicz in Hrubieszów, Poland in 1918. In 1925
he and his mother immigrated to the United States, joining his father - an orthodox
Hassidic rabbi - in Brooklyn. In an interview with Larry Gross in which he
discussed his personal background, Rokeach (1964a) described his father as a harsh
disciplinarian, prone to angry outbursts, and enforcing the expectation that Rokeach
and his siblings carry on their family's orthodox Jewish traditions and beliefs. He
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identified his upbringing in this environment as influential for his later
psychological and social interests, once commenting "The orthodoxy of my
background is to play an extremely important role in my professional life... My
interest in [psychological research on] dogmatism -- you don't have to do much
psychoanalytic interpretation to see the influence" (p. 49). More generally, he
described his budding political interests as emerging from his reactions against
what he saw as dogmatism in his family and religious education, but also as a
reaction against the dogmatic Marxism that he observed among friends and peers
as he grew beyond these settings (Rokeach, 1989).
Having completed his Orthodox yeshiva education, Rokeach would receive
his Bachelor's degree in psychology in 1941 from Brooklyn College, then notable
for its inclusion of a number of prominent Jewish professors among its faculty
despite the anti-Semitism that characterized most comparable universities. Among
these faculty, Rokeach studied under the tutelage of such influential mentors as
Abraham Maslow and Solomon Asch (Rokeach, 1964a). The year of his
graduation, he would begin doctoral studies at the University of California,
Berkeley, only to be interrupted a year later by the period of U.S. involvement in
WWII, during which time Rokeach was enlisted in the Air Force Testing Program.
By 1947, he would complete his doctorate with a specialization in Social
Psychology, having collaborated with Else Frenkel-Brunswik and Nevitt Sanford
in their research program on anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, and authoritarianism.
These mentors, in collaboration with renowned sociologist and philosopher
Theodor Adorno, would be among the first prominent psychologists to seek to use
their research to respond to the atrocities of the Holocaust, producing the influential
book The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, &
Sanford, 1950) with sociologist and philosopher Theodor Adorno and their
colleague Daniel Levinson. As a Polish Jew, Rokeach himself had been deeply
affected by the events of the Holocaust. It would take two decades from the end of
the WWII before Rokeach felt emotionally prepared to return to his childhood
home of Hrubieszow, whose formerly substantial Jewish community had been
decimated, with only one Jew remaining in residence (S. Ball-Rokeach, personal
communication, March 5, 2017; Korn, 1965).
In a later interview, Rokeach (1980) recalled deep interest in the questions
that Frenkel-Brunswick's and Sanford's research raised. Most particularly, he was
interested in understanding how similar research could furnish solutions to the realworld problems - such as racial and ethnic discrimination - that appeared to be
associated with their notions of authoritarian personality traits. Indeed, the greater
importance of this work for Rokeach lay not in what it revealed about past fascist
regimes, but in how it might be generalizable to other phenomena which touched
his personal life. Encounters with anti-Semitic ethnocentrism in Rokeach's
childhood, college education, and military career, for instance, had certainly left
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significant marks (Christie, 1990; Rokeach, 1964a). However, for Rokeach, such
discrimination shared a common root with other ideologies which he viewed as
rigid and unquestioning. "I hate not only fascism," he noted in an interview, "but
anything that is going to enslave me" (Rokeach, 1964a, p. 68). For Rokeach, this
included religious and political dogmatism in a variety of forms that he had
encountered throughout his life - from fascism, to Orthodox Judaism, to the
communist party. Following the completion of his doctorate, Rokeach's research
career would begin by extending the themes he had helped to investigate at
Berkeley, advancing theory and research on ethnocentrism and dogmatism beyond
The Authoritarian Personality's focus on fascism and anti-Semitism.
Social Relevance in Social Psychology
By the late 1960s, Rokeach's social psychological research, particularly his
development of the influential Rokeach Dogmatism Scale, had earned him
prominence within the field. Despite this recognition, he expressed discontent with
the research he had generated. In a talk given at the University of Pennsylvania
entitled Toward a More Relevant Social Psychology, he indicated in broad terms
the guiding principles which had organized his life's work: "In all my work these
past two decades I have tried to keep in mind two major criteria of what is
significant... worth investing my time in as a social psychologist. One criterion is
theoretical relevance; the other is social relevance" (Rokeach, 1969b, p. 1).
However, while social relevance served as a point of departure for Rokeach's
research, he had now begun to question whether the findings it produced had any
real meaning for, or impact on, the social problems that had inspired them. Rokeach
remarked with dissatisfaction that with one isolated and somewhat narrow
exception, he had never been gratified with direct knowledge that his research had
been put to a practical application that he viewed as truly socially relevant. For
Rokeach, this state of affairs signaled that his work was missing its intended mark;
though theoretically influential, his research had failed to furnish genuine solutions
for real-life social issues.
Rokeach did not limit this reproach to himself, however. On the contrary,
he generalized the critique to the field of social psychology as a whole. In his
University of Pennsylvania speech, he expressed agreement with former APA
president Carl Rogers' identification of academic psychology as "socially
hopeless," and "leading every field in dogmatism, rigidity, narrow orthodoxy, and
scorn of social involvement" (as cited in Rokeach, 1969b, p. 2). Indeed, the sense
that psychology, and especially social psychology, had drifted into irrelevance was
growing increasingly widespread in the United States during the late 1960s and into
the 1970s, as a state of crisis within the field was diagnosed by numerous
commentators. Concern about irrelevance was driven in part by scrutiny from
government and funding agencies which began to inquire more critically into the
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utility of social scientific research. A 1967 House Subcommittee investigation of
federally-funded social science research, for instance, concluded that the findings
produced by such research were often trivial or unsuitable for practical application
(Faye, 2011).
Public opinion also drove this sense of disciplinary crisis. With civil rights
demonstrations, student protest, and increasing involvement in the Vietnam War
producing a mounting sense of social tension, the social sciences and humanities having successfully established their expertise in questions related to the kinds of
social issues the nation now confronted - were subject to particular scrutiny. Such
concerns were particularly salient within Division 9 of the American Psychological
Association, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). As
the 1960s drew to a close, the editors of SPSSI's Journal of Social Issues David
Krech and Nevitt Sanford (1968) noted with alarm the declining membership of the
division and the "apparent shortage of social psychologists willing and able to work
on major social problems."
Not content simply to vocalize his qualms with social psychology, Rokeach
explored a number of strategies for taking socially relevant action during this
period. In his personal life, Rokeach was a vocal advocate for the same social issues
that he spoke on professionally, participating in multiple civil rights marches, and
once joining a sit-in protest of the Vietnam War (S. Ball-Rokeach, personal
communication, March 5, 2017). In 1967, Rokeach was elected president of SPSSI.
That year, he was responsible for inviting Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. - on behalf of
the division - to speak at a conference of the American Psychological Association
on the role of psychologists in the Black Civil Rights Movement. In one letter, he
suggested that Dr. King might urge his audience to play a greater role in
communicating to activists, on the grounds that "the concrete gains of the Civil
Rights Revolutions owe practically nothing to the American intellectual, or social
scientist" (1967c). Through his platform as SPSSI president, Rokeach thus sought
to mobilize his colleagues toward increasingly socially relevant work.
The Legitimation of Evil
An APA conference in 1965 provided the basis for another of Rokeach's efforts at
mobilizing his fellow psychologists towards social action and activism. This was
only two years after Hannah Arendt's publication of her famous work on the
"banality of evil" in 1963, which portrayed Adolf Eichmann's orchestration of the
Nazi concentration camp system as a function of his psychological normalcy or
banality operating within an evil system, rather than attributing his behavior to a
fundamentally monstrous, sadistic or authoritarian personality. That year had also
marked Stanley Milgram's (1963) Behavioral Study of Obedience, which seemed
to show that ordinary individuals were willing and able to inflict considerable harm
on others when such actions were demanded and sanctioned by an authority. At
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the APA conference, Rokeach (1965b) contrasted these perspectives with the
dominant body of psychological research. To Rokeach, it appeared that other
psychologists had remained content to keep distant from the question of whether
such evils as genocide, poverty, systematic discrimination, and oppression were
caused by inevitable and intractable aspects of personality, or whether they were a
result of psychological processes which were more subject to change. With
Milgram as a notable exception, psychologists who had commented on this
question - as had the researchers responsible for The Authoritarian Personality
(Adorno et al. 1950) - seemed to Rokeach content to seek explanations which
assumed the former. His own contention, however, was that such an analysis only
led psychologists to take for granted or ignore a variety of homegrown evils, such
as the atrocities of war perpetrated by U.S. forces in Vietnam and the oppression of
Black communities domestically. If such problems were seen as intractable and
inevitable, then psychologists would be unlikely to advance efforts at
understanding and mitigating them.
In contrast, Rokeach displayed considerable optimism about the capacity of
social psychology to address domestic incarnations of these problems. Unlike Nazi
Germany, Rokeach perceived the culture of the United States to be deeply torn over
its own social ills of racism, poverty and the like. While he had yet to complete
any systematic study of the subject at the time of this APA talk, he suggested that
the U.S. was home to "conflicting values" (Rokeach, 1965b). Although the United
States' culture harbored values which reaffirmed or legitimized evil, many
American values also favored resistance to forces that threatened to limit freedom
and equality. Given the heterogeneity of U.S. values, Rokeach hoped that the
nation would be replete with opportunities for psychologists to tip the scales in
favor of resistance, musing "could not a social system which legitimizes goodness
rather than evil produce thousands of banal Schweitzers and Martin Luther Kings
rather than Eichmanns?" (p. 4).
While it seems that he had already begun to reconceptualize social problems
previously attributed to dogmatism, authoritarianism or mental-rigidity as problems
of values (Ball-Rokeach, personal communication, May 10, 2017; Rokeach,
1965b), Rokeach's desire to mobilize his colleagues toward social change and social
relevance would lead him towards another project which would feature more
prominently in his professional activity shortly after the talk. Early the following
year, SPSSI would respond to Rokeach's call for psychologists to openly oppose
domestic instances of legitimized evil as it related to issues of race and social class
(Weichlein, 1966). Additionally, division leaders cited the need to "dispel the
apathy of the American people toward the torture aspect of the war in Vietnam" (p.
3) as its most urgent and pressing goal in responding to this call. Among other
proposed initiatives, SPSSI planned to sponsor a committee led by Dr. Rokeach to
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produce a book- or journal-length volume assembling commentary from a variety
of authors on the problem of the legitimation of evil in the U.S.
The Legitimation of Evil project began promisingly, with at least a dozen
psychologists and other scholars - including such prominent authors as B. F.
Skinner, Kurt Wolff, Nevitt Sanford, and Stanley Milgram - offering to contribute
(Milgram, 1966; Rokeach, 1968c). Rokeach showed considerable enthusiasm for
the endeavor, identifying it as one of his most important activities as a
representative of SPSSI during his presidency for the division, to which he had been
elected while organizing the project (Rokeach, 1967b). By 1968, however, only a
handful of would-be contributors had met their commitments, with several
declining or withdrawing their intent to contribute. While some cited time
constraints and other barriers to completion, one writer, psychiatrist Jules
Masserman, responded to a solicitation for his contribution by discouraging the
continuation of the project. Noting that he was sympathetic to the committee's
aims, Masserman (1966) suggested that such a work's primary consequence would
nonetheless be "to lull the consciences of its authors while they are diverted from
more direct and useful work."
Expressing deep disappointment, Rokeach was eventually forced to call for
the abandonment of the project. M. Brewster Smith (1969), a close colleague of
Rokeach’s and among the few authors to complete a submission for the
Legitimation of Evil, attributed the project's difficulties to a social climate that was
unreceptive to scholarly and intellectualized approaches to social problems.
Rokeach, however, took the failure more personally. To Thomas Pettigrew, a
fellow SPSSI leader, he wrote:
This is the first time I have attempted to bring together various other
people's contributions in some intellectually competent way and I feel that
I am not cut out for the role of badgerer-editor. I now realize that it was a
mistake for me to have agreed to this in the first place (1968d).
Throughout this period, however, Rokeach had maintained his parallel desire to
understand the role of values in shaping the social problems he had hoped to
ameliorate through the Legitimation of Evil project. With his efforts at editorship
ending unsuccessfully, Rokeach would return to research as the primary strategy
by which he sought to affect social change, now with values and value modification
at the center of his work.
Precursors to the Psychological Study of Values
Rokeach was not the first to propose that a psychology of values could be an
important tool for bringing about social changes. Such views were especially
prominent within SPSSI, an organization whose founders were motivated in part
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by Marxist, socialist or otherwise left-wing political views, accompanied by the
pragmatic analysis of values advanced by John Dewey (Stagner, 1986; Winston,
2011). In its fifth year of publication, for instance, an issue of SPSSI's Journal of
Social Issues was devoted to questions about the role of values in psychological
science, calling for a new "science of valuation" (Benne & Swanson, 1950). The
volume prominently featured the views of psychologists aligned with pragmatic
philosophy and Lewinian action research, alongside disputing perspectives which
questioned whether values constituted a valid subject of scientific inquiry (e.g.,
Feigl, 1950).
Many of Rokeach's key claims echoed assertions made by SPSSI
membership dating before the end of World War II. For instance, SPSSI's third
president, George Hartmann (1939), had given a presidential address titled Value
as the Unifying Concept in the Social Sciences, anticipating Rokeach's suggestion
that a psychology of values would be more open to interdisciplinary work. Paving
the way for Rokeach's social action endeavors, scholars such as Woodruff and
DiVesta (1948) argued that an understanding of human values was indispensable
to any efforts to produce lasting social and behavioral change. Similarly, the notion
that values were central to the formal and informal processes of education - which
would feature prominently in Rokeach's later research - had been suggested by a
number of earlier scholars. For instance, Rokeach's use of the phrase "reeducation," appears to have been borrowed from Kurt Lewin and Paul Grabbe
(1945), who used it to denote the process of bringing about changes in values,
standards and habits, the aim of which "is essentially equivalent to changes in
culture" (p.55), although these authors lamented the paucity of effective methods
for bringing about such change. In contrast, authors such as Benne & Swanson
(1950) were more optimistic, expressing hope that it may only be a matter of time
before the practical details of a psychology of values would be worked out.
Although a number of scholars had proposed that psychologists direct
greater attention to values, such proposals were not immune to controversy. For
some psychologists, discussions about human values seemed to fall more under the
jurisdiction of spiritual and religious doctrine than that of scientific inquiry (Evans,
1980). For others, values seemed too overtly political to be a safe subject matter
for psychologists. The notion of a psychology of values - particularly as it might
relate to political and social issues - would grow increasingly controversial in the
decade following WWII. Winston (2011) attributes the push towards "value
neutrality" in SPSSI during this period to the influence of McCarthyism. Rokeach
(1965b) himself, in recollecting the impact of McCarthyism on academia, would
later recount "all too many American liberals and intellectuals understood clearly
the dangers of McCarthyism in this country but took a seat far in the back of the
struggle against McCarthyism... because of fear" (p.5). Indeed, Rokeach's own
experiences make clear that McCarthyism was a salient political reality for him as
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well as other psychologists. At least one psychologist in his acquaintance - fellow
SPSSI member Ralph Gundlach - would be tried by a State Un-American Activities
Committee on accusations of affiliation with the Communist Party in the years after
WWII, with Gundlach (1948) even soliciting Rokeach for a written testimony
speaking to his good character to be used in his legal defense. Gundlach would be
dismissed from his university position the following year as a result of the
investigation, later serving a brief jail sentence after being convicted of contempt
in connection with the case (Sargent & Harris, 1986).
In this climate of political neutrality, research on values - particularly those
closely linked with controversial social issues - may have been particularly
discouraged as inviting accusations of scientific or political bias (Winston, 2011).
Nonetheless, by the late 1960s, Rokeach found sympathetic interest in his call for
a more value-sensitive psychology among at least some of his colleagues. Fellow
SPSSI member Stuart Cook (1969) - commenting on the published version of
Rokeach's SPSSI address - indicated that "An emphasis on the significance of
values is not new among social psychologists, and few will wish to argue with the
points Rokeach makes" (p. 11). What was unusual about Rokeach's proposal,
according to Cook, was not his assertion that values were important, but his
provision of concrete methods by which social psychologists might actually begin
the work of experimentally studying changes in human values - in particular, by
experimentally inducing such changes in a research setting.
Re-centering toward Values in Social Psychology
Rokeach's interest in research on human values appears to have emerged early in
the 1960s from his work on an International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences
chapter on attitudes (Mayton, Ball-Rokeach, & Loges, 1994; Rokeach, 1968c).
However, he would become increasingly convinced of, and vocal about, the
importance of values as a research construct in the late-1960s - around the time that
social psychologists began to express concerns about a state of "crisis" in their field.
Some social psychologists, seeking to furnish solutions to this crisis, urged that the
most appropriate response to psychology's apparent social irrelevance was to
abandon traditional experimental research methodologies in favor of more
sociological or even historical methods (Faye, 2011). For Rokeach, however, the
discipline's problems were not primarily methodological. Rather, minimal social
relevance was attributed to the subject matter that social psychologists had selected
as the preferred targets of their inquiry. Specifically, Rokeach asserted that social
psychology had remained mired in irrelevance because of their misplaced emphasis
on attitudes and attitude change.
Rokeach had already grappled with questions about the most suitable
objects of study for an action-oriented research program early in his career, when
he had distanced himself from work on more change-resistant personality traits -
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such as authoritarianism and dogmatism - in favor of cognitive variables, especially
attitudinal ones such as ethnocentrism and opinionation (Rokeach, 1960; 1989).
Three decades after Gordon Allport's (1935) identification of attitude as social
psychology's core construct, attitudinal variables remained dominant as one of the
most important constructs employed in the field when his research career began.
But while attitudes were conceptualized as being more susceptible to influence than
innate personality traits, they also seemed too often to be frustratingly resistant to
social psychologists' efforts to affect lasting change. To Rokeach (1969b) social
psychology seemed to be unduly "fixated" on attitude change, despite its
limitations, predicting that theories addressing themselves to this process - such as
Leon Festinger's cognitive dissonance theory - would soon be abandoned.
Rokeach's (1968a) view of this problem was shaped by his theoretical
understanding of what he termed attitude-value systems, in which the thousands of
attitudes that a given individual might display were all organized around something
like a few dozen core values. In his view, the limitations of attitude change efforts
were partly attributable to their misplaced focus on the content of these systems
(attitudes themselves), while failing to acknowledge the underlying structure
provided by values. In the absence of these structural changes, attitude changes
were anticipated to be relatively small and transient. Rokeach (1968a; 1973)
described such efforts as being characterized by "persuasion" - a process that he
associated with such phenomena as group pressure, forced compliance, advertising,
and propaganda. In contrast, he used "education" or "re-education" to refer to
changes in values and identified these processes as among the primary changeagents in schooling, psychotherapy, and everyday socialization and cultural change.
In contrast to attitudes, values were furthermore seen as closely bound with
motivation, implying an intrinsic "imperative to action" (Rokeach, 1968a, p. 16).
Rokeach made clear his feeling that social psychology had settled
prematurely on the wrong core concept by prioritizing attitude change. In hopes of
dispelling this "fixation," Rokeach made the centerpiece of his SPSSI address an
entreaty for a "re-centering" of the field towards the prioritization of values, with
particular attention being devoted to the process of value change (Rokeach, 1968a).
This approach would characterize much of Rokeach's work in the ensuing two
decades of his career.
Experimentally-Induced Value Change
Unlike prior calls for a psychology of values which had failed to prompt much
research activity, Rokeach did not stop at an account of the benefits that could be
anticipated to follow from such a program. By the time of his SPSSI address, he
had already developed a measure of relative rankings of individuals' or groups'
values, the Rokeach Value Survey. In earlier letters to M. Brewster Smith, Rokeach
acknowledged that many of his decisions in defining and conceptualizing values
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were made with an eye toward elegant operationalization and measurement. His
bold assumption that all attitudes – without exception – could be attributed to the
manifestation of a relatively small number of values, for instance, was made in part
in an effort to “side-step” the task of differentiating values from “functionally
autonomous attitudes,” which he viewed as insurmountable otherwise (Rokeach,
1964c; 1965a). He also introduced a method for experimentally inducing value
change - what he would call "self-confrontation" (Rokeach, 1973). Rokeach
viewed self-confrontation as non-coercive, and suggested it might escape some of
the ethical concerns that other popular research methods for inducing change in
attitudes or behaviors had prompted from both academia and the public.
Rokeach's (1973) next book, The Nature of Human Values, would outline
in greater detail his theoretical understanding of values, and presented findings
from his initial investigations based on new methods for their study. Although his
project was a decidedly practical one, Rokeach’s pragmatism did not restrain him
from making enthusiastic predictions about the benefits to be anticipated as a result
of this work. Regarding his value measure, for instance, he noted: “The danger of
such an instrument is that… the Value Survey might be seen as ‘good for
everything.’ Ironically, though, it can be suggested that the measurement of values
is relevant to virtually any human problem one might be able to think of” (p. 52).
In this book alone, he would put his developing value theory to use in analyzing
such wide-ranging phenomena as political ideology, religious involvement and
belief, consumer product preferences, individual ethical conduct, crime, choice of
academic major, career choice and occupational roles, the Black Civil Rights
movement, student and antiwar protests, the hippie counterculture, and others.
Value Self-Confrontation
The notion of confrontation as a strategy for affecting change had featured
prominently in Rokeach's (1964b) controversial The Three Christs of Ypsilanti. In
this book, he recounted a study in which he had arranged for three schizophrenia
patients, each of whom believed himself to be Christ, to participate in a program
led by himself and his research assistants in which they confront one another with
their delusional and mutually incompatible identities. Through carefully facilitated
"confrontation with others," Rokeach had hoped to identify techniques for affecting
changes in some of our most fundamental beliefs - those related to self-concept.
While the study concluded that this kind of confrontation was insufficient to
produce the intended changes, he would later cite this experience as influential for
his work on value change. In an interview in which he discussed this study,
Rokeach (1980) reflected:
I think I learned what it is to confront other people with contradictions, and
I also think I learned what it means to confront one's self. Basically, this

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/psychologyfromthemargins/vol1/iss1/2

10

Jadaszewski: Milton Rokeach's Experimental Modification of Values

work laid the groundwork for the work that I'm now doing on changing
values, and with it changing behavior with the method I now call selfconfrontation (p.118).
In an afterward for the book written some twenty years later, Rokeach (1981) also
acknowledged his sense that this style of confrontation had resulted in needless
distress to the study's participants, citing his ethical qualms as another reason for
the shift to self-confrontation in his later work.
The self-confrontation method Rokeach (1973) developed in his research
on values sought to prompt change while avoiding the defensiveness and sense of
coercion which could occur in confrontation with others. The method was
predicated on the notion that internal contradictions within our attitude-value
systems (most especially highlighting contradictions of our values with our selfconcepts, attitudes, beliefs, behaviors or other our values) were normative
phenomena. Each of us was assumed to harbor numerous such contradictions, often
without our awareness. The self-confrontation method relied on making research
participants aware of these contradictions, resulting in a state of "selfdissatisfaction" (p. 226). Rokeach attributed this notion to John Dewey's concept
of a "felt difficulty," conceptualized as a precondition for any learning, change or
growth. For instance, in a study intended to affect value change among Michigan
State University students, Rokeach provided participants who had completed his
value survey with the following prompt:
Now I would like to tell you some things we have already found out about
the value systems of Michigan State students... The students, on the average,
felt that freedom was very important - they ranked it 1; but they felt that
equality was considerably less important - they ranked it 11. Apparently,
Michigan State students value freedom far more highly than they value
equality. This suggests that MSU students, in general, are much more
interested in their own freedom than they are in freedom for other people.
Feel free to spend a few minutes comparing your own rankings on the
preceding page with those of the... students (p. 425).
Upon reading this prompt, it was anticipated that many participants would feel that
they ought to have rated equality more highly, becoming dissatisfied with their own
ratings of equality as reflected by the survey. This dissatisfaction would make these
participants aware of an internal contradiction or incongruence between their
present values and their self-concepts. Although no explicit instructions were given
for how to resolve their sense of dissatisfaction, Rokeach expected that participants
made aware of similar internal contradictions would be motivated to reprioritize
their own values in a direction that lead to greater congruence between those values
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and their preferred conceptualizations of themselves as moral and competent
individuals.
Contrasting this approach with persuasive methods of attitude change,
Rokeach saw self-confrontation as educative and informative in nature, intended to
facilitate growth and the approach of "self-actualization" (Rokeach, 1975). While
changes in values resulting from self-confrontation tended to occur in specific,
predictable directions, Rokeach cautiously asserted that change would only be
observed if participants themselves genuinely experienced the indicated
contradictions as problematic and wished to resolve them. Indeed, whereas
persuasion research in Rokeach's (1973) conceptualization involved participants
passively receiving an experimental manipulation, self-confrontation required that
participants take an active part in the change process. This process was thus
distinctly humanistic in its conceptualization, with the participants' development of
increasing congruence between values and self-concept at its center. Furthermore,
because the psychologist took the drive to be moral and competent to be universal
or near-universal (Rokeach, 1964b; 1973), self-confrontation could always be
predicted to steer participants' values away from those compatible with selfdefeating, evil and harmful ideologies.
In his own estimation, Rokeach had identified a powerful tool for affecting
social change. In The Nature of Human Values (1973), he indicated that a singlesession using self-confrontation and emphasizing the value equality had produced
increases in replies to solicitations for donation to the NAACP, as well as
enrollment among student participants in social science and education courses
related to issues of ethnic and religious diversity. Students' responses to openended questions indicated other changes, including increased involvement in
activist work, changes in educational enrollment, and modified political beliefs.
Rokeach (1980) viewed the study as a successful attempt to "change the values that
underlie civil rights behavior" (p. 120), he thus viewed the study as a success. For
the author, these findings suggested that value changes produced by selfconfrontation were no mere academic curiosity, but rather reflected participants'
willingness to invest in issues of social importance. This success was made all the
more resounding in Rokeach's eyes by findings suggesting that changes produced
by exposure to a single self-confrontation session remained observable months or
even years later.
Rokeach would initiate numerous applications of this self-confrontation
method using his value scale, both in and out of research settings. Less formal
applications of this approach were carried out in talks before groups ranging from
Lutheran ministers (Rokeach & Regan, 1980) to specialist assistants to White
House cabinet members (Rokeach, 1969a) and to "top level scientists and
administrators with [NASA]" (Henderson, 1968). Rokeach's procedure when
giving talks to groups of non-psychologists seems to have been to request that
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attendees complete his values scales prior to the discussion. During his
presentation, attendees could then be prompted to reflect on their own value
rankings in light of research findings he presented (for instance, highlighting an
apparent contradiction between one attendee's low ranking of the value "salvation"
and his career choice in ministry; Rokeach & Regan, 1980). Rokeach would also
introduce procedures for educators (Rokeach, 1975) and counselors (Rokeach &
Regan, 1980) to make more intentional the value change processes that he saw as
implicit in these institutions. Other authors appearing in a publication edited by
Rokeach (Understanding Human Values; 1979) would make recommendations for
the use of value self-confrontation in a still greater range of settings, extending the
approach to procedures for leaders of public health organizations, the Black Civil
Rights movement and other social movements.
A New Ethics of Value Change
Rokeach seems to have prepared for a greater volume of critical response to the
research ethics guiding his work on values than it would actually receive. In his
account of the study with Michigan State University students described above, for
instance, he noted: "It was anticipated that many experimental subjects would now
protest having been unduly influenced or manipulated. To our surprise, not a single
one of them reacted this way" (Rokeach, 1973, p.304). Rokeach also appears to
have preemptively defended against the kinds of ethical criticisms toward his work
that he expected to receive from fellow scholars. In a later passage in The Nature
of Human Values, Rokeach described the sort of backlash that he anticipated:
...Every teacher who takes professional pride in his work would like to think
that his teaching has affected the values, attitudes, and behavior of his
students in some significant way. So long as he cannot prove that what he
does in the classroom has in fact resulted in such a change, his assertions
that it has will go unnoticed and unchallenged. But as soon as he can
demonstrate that his teaching methods have indeed resulted in enduring
effects on his students, especially on their values, he risks the criticism that
he is unethically manipulating them without their informed consent (p.335).
Ethics Controversy in Social Psychological Research
In an era in which some of the most celebrated psychological works were also
among the most sharply criticized for alleged ethical lapses, Rokeach's caution may
be unsurprising. Rokeach (1980) himself referred to the ethical controversy - like
that surrounding the work of social psychologists Stanley Milgram and Phillip
Zimbardo, or B. F. Skinner - as a problem "that plagues... psychology, now more
than ever before in history" (p. 122). Ring (1967) critiqued what he saw as a "funand-games approach" to psychological research - a challenge that Rokeach (1973)
appears to have taken seriously. The author accused followers of Kurt Lewin's
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humanistically-grounded, action-oriented approach of having drifted toward a
preference for flashy, dramatically-staged and needlessly-counterintuitive research
designs which, for all their novelty, provided little utility or real-world insight
(Ring, 1967). For the author, this raised serious questions about whether
psychologists were exploiting the trust of their participants, not to mention the faith
of their students that what they were learning was meaningful.
Rokeach's attentiveness to these concerns may also be attributable at least
in some part to his personal experiences with the controversies surrounding his own
use of deception in research. In his research for The Three Christs of Ypsilanti,
Rokeach (1964b) had employed deceptive methods ranging from misleading his
participants about the purpose of the study, to forging letters to participants
allegedly written by real individuals or fictional ones within their delusional belief
systems. He would later note that his ethical concerns about the distress resulting
from these deceptions, and from the study's "confrontation with others" approach,
contributed to his decision to end the study early (Rokeach, 1981).
Another controversy emerged surrounding an article published by Rokeach
and Louis Mezei (1966) in the journal Science, which addressed the roles of
similarity and difference in belief systems in racial discrimination. The controversy
pertained to the authors' use of unwitting job applicants as its subjects. The
participants were prompted to complete surveys and engage in a group discussion
with confederates of the researchers posing as fellow applicants, with observations
from these sources later being used as data in the study without their knowledge.
The use of deception and omission of informed consent procedures in this study
sparked a number of critical responses received by the journal and the authors. One
commentator charged that Rokeach and Mezei's study was a reflection of the failure
of psychology as a field to adequately protect human rights and privacy, noting that
similar practices in medical research had resulted in strict censures against the
experimenters (Miller, 1966). While Rokeach (1966) defended his research design
as scientifically necessary in his response, he also acknowledged his sense of being
caught in a "moral dilemma" (p. 15) between the conflicting demands of scientific
inquiry and participants' rights.
Ethics in Self-Confrontation
In Rokeach's (1981) view, it was not only crucial that self-confrontation represent
an advancement in the technical task of affecting psychological and behavioral
change, but it was also equally important that it escaped the kinds of moral
dilemmas which had dogged past psychological research conducted by himself and
others. Accordingly, he devoted considerable effort to articulating how selfconfrontation avoided these pitfalls. Indeed, if this method was more efficient than
these competing techniques of value, attitude and behavior modification as
Rokeach (1980) suggested, than this eliminated the need for either deceptive
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research designs, attitudinal persuasion or other forms of experimental
manipulation which placed less priority on the individual's agency in affecting
change. Indeed, Rokeach (1973) attributed the "fun-and-games approach" to
psychological research described by Ring (1967) as being directly tied to the
overreliance on such approaches.
At the same time, research on value self-confrontation would introduce a
new host of ethical concerns. Psychologists had begun to voice questions about the
ethics of a psychology of values long before Rokeach's work in this domain began.
For instance, Ronald Lippitt (1950), editor of the Journal of Social Issues volume
dedicated to the topic of values in psychology, had posed the question of whether
the development of techniques for value change would provide social scientists
with the means to exert "an undemocratic control of our lives" (p. 1). Indeed,
although B. F. Skinner framed his own methods of behavior modification in
behavioral terms, rather than value-oriented ones, he would find himself subject to
similar accusations of exerting an anti-democratic or totalitarian influence during
the cultural crisis of the 1960s and 70s (Rutherford, 2003). Elsewhere, accusations
of ethical misconduct had been directed towards psychotherapists for their roles in
changing values even when this change was unintentional, with critics suggesting
that psychotherapists could be viewed as "crypto-missionaries" or "hidden
preachers," and accusing them of "indoctrination" and "brainwashing" (see
Tjeltveit, 1986).
Rokeach was proactive in clarifying the ethical nature of his new research
methods, raising the question of appropriate ethical precautions in value change
research as early as his presidential address to SPSSI (1968a). In The Nature of
Human Values (1973), he presented three criteria, developed in collaboration with
an ethics committee at Michigan State University, which could guide research
based on his methods, also noting that he saw them as equally relevant for applied
uses of self-confrontation outside of research. Any deceptive feedback was
identified as flatly indefensible, a criterion both consistent with the method's
humanistic conceptualization and the contemporary reactions against the
"deception-research paradigm" (e.g. Ring, 1967). The remaining two criteria
specified that any intended value change be "compatible with the basic assumptions
of a democratic society and, even more important, in the interest of all humanity"
(Rokeach, 1973, p. 336). At a minimum, this meant that self-confrontation ought
to foster or at least preserve such humanitarian values as a world at peace, freedom,
and equality. These designations were explicitly political in nature; in Rokeach's
scheme, high ratings of the values freedom and equality constituted a "moderate
left" or "socialist" (p. 171, 184) political orientation, with Capitalism ("Moderate
Right"), Fascism ("Extreme Right") and Communism ("Extreme Left") each being
identified with low ratings in one or both of these values.
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Despite his precautions, Rokeach noted that a new technology of value
change might entail certain "uneasy" or even "frightening" implications,
particularly with regard to the possibility of modifying political and religious
values. Could values be manipulated in any direction that researchers chose?
Could this be used to sway the odds in political elections, or to promote the kinds
of fascist, dogmatic and ethnocentric social ideologies that Rokeach sought to
counteract? He expressed cautious optimism, on theoretical grounds, that selfconfrontation could only produce changes that improved one's self-conception as
competent and moral. To Rokeach, this suggested that human values were
intrinsically resistant to modifications that would lead to dogmatically antihumanistic or anti-democratic ideologies, as such ideologies were seen as
depending upon a certain degree of incongruence between these values and selfconcept. However, Rokeach (1973) also believed that the matter could only be
settled through empirical investigation. Because his own research ethics would
proscribe against direct investigation of the most troubling of these possibilities (to
attempt to use self-confrontation to try to promote fascist attitudes by reducing
participants' rankings of such "democratic" values as freedom and equality would
be clearly unacceptable), such questions would have to remain discomfortingly
unresolved. Being keenly attentive to the ethical nature of his work, however,
Rokeach would seek new ways of gaining insight into these questions as his career
progressed.
Value Change on a Mass Media Scale: The Great American Value Test
A significant development for questions about the role of psychologists' value
change interventions in society would be prompted by a 1979 study that Rokeach
contributed to with his wife - Sandra Ball-Rokeach, a sociologist and professor of
communications - as lead researcher. The study provided the focus for their book
The Great American Value Test (Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach & Grube, 1984). The
project aimed in part to test Ball-Rokeach's media dependency theory, positing that
techniques for affecting individual change using media will be most effective for
individuals whose dependency on the media is greatest. Because Rokeach's selfconfrontation was the method used for affecting change in this study, the
researchers would simultaneously have the opportunity to observe its effectiveness
in a mass media setting - a first for the method (Ball-Rokeach, personal
communication, June 15, 2017).
Changes in values and associated attitudes and behaviors (measured as
donations to corresponding charitable causes) would be observed over a period of
several weeks among participants in two matched Washington areas. In the TriCities area consisting of Richland, Pasco and Kennewick, Washington - referred to
throughout the study as "Experimental City" - the researchers arranged to broadcast
a 30-minute television program that they had written and produced. The nearby
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city of Yakima, Washington would serve as the "Control City." The program
included information about value distributions in America and prompted viewers
to reflect on their own values, borrowing directly from the self-confrontation
procedures described in The Nature of Human Values. Comparing survey results
for residents of the experimental and control cities before and after the broadcast,
the researchers found changes in values, attitudes and behaviors in the expected
directions, some of which seemed to persist at least two to three months after the
experimental manipulation.
Second Thoughts on the Ethics of Value Change
Even though findings were consistent with the study's objectives, the researchers
expressed concern about what these findings might mean, devoting a chapter at the
end of their book to the studies' ethical implications. They concluded that their
effort to facilitate increases in values of equality and a world of beauty, and in
stimulating increased giving to charities for social egalitarian and environmentalist
causes, were consistent with the social scientists' "legitimate role in bringing about
a better society" (Ball-Rokeach et al., 1984, p. 166). Indeed, the project had passed
through the university review board without controversy (S. Ball-Rokeach,
personal communication, June 15, 2017). What raised concern was the ease with
which their methods appeared to produce such change on a mass scale.
Can a Hitler, or any politician, or Madison Avenue apply our work for their
benefit? In responding to this question, we take a position that is
substantially different from a position we took in earlier discussions (Grube,
1982; Rokeach 1973; Rokeach & Grube, 1979). We now think that the
experimental findings... do not necessarily imply that only the maintenance
and enhancement of a person's self-esteem will be served... They may also
serve the noble or ignoble purposes of those doing the influencing - for
instance, appeals for funds to support public television or the KKK, appeals
to teenagers to buy speedy cars, or appeals for money or votes by politicians
of either the left or right. (p. 169-70).
Similarly, in the book's preface, the authors - acknowledging the irony of the book's
1984 publication date - suggest that their findings ought to draw attention to the
capacity of television as a tool of Orwellian control. The gravity of this concern
for the authors was such that in the book's final paragraph they note that "we
entertained the possibility... of not reporting the outcome of this research" (p.171172), explaining that they ultimately arrived at the decision to do so only because
they found the prospect of suppressing scientific findings to be still more dangerous
or distasteful.
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Given that the findings of this study generally conformed to the researchers'
predictions, to what can this change in position be attributed? Although the
researchers had sought to observe what changes beliefs, attitudes and values their
television program might produce, they repeatedly note their surprise, and near
disbelief, in the magnitude of changes produced by just a single exposure to the 30minute program (Bell-Rokeach et al., 1984). For instance, they reported a 75%
greater rate of donation per person to non-profit organizations associated with the
target values of equality and a world of beauty over the three-month follow-up
period in the Experimental City as compared with the Control City. Furthermore,
the project had been considered by many of their colleagues to be a hopeless one
given the conservative political climate in the eastern region of Washington where
their data was collected, making their findings all the more striking (S. BallRokeach, personal communication, June 15, 2017).
If such robust changes in values, attitudes and behaviors could be so
efficiently facilitated by using self-confrontation via mass media, then any risk that
these techniques might be abused had to be taken all the more seriously. Around
this time, a number of events suggested that this risk might be greater than
Rokeach's theoretical grounds for optimism had previously suggested. Empirical
findings by Rokeach and his colleagues (e.g. Grube, 1982; Rokeach & Grube,
1979) led to a reformulation of the researchers' assumptions. Since increases in all
values included in the Rokeach Value Survey, for instance, could sometimes be
consistent with individuals' self-concepts, it might be possible to prompt
individuals to prioritize other values over values like freedom and equality perhaps decreasing their salience for such purposes as political decision-making.
Thus, it was not until after the Great American Values Test study began that certain
theoretical limitations began to suggest directly the possibility that the selfconfrontation method might be used for ends contrary to those for which Rokeach
had intended them.
Even these theoretical problems, however, may not have been the most
significant drivers of the heightened sense of urgency about ethical matters in this
work. More frightening still to the researchers, it began to appear that interest in
their techniques was growing among political groups which they saw as directly
opposed to the kinds of social change that Rokeach hoped to facilitate using selfconfrontation. Ball-Rokeach and Rokeach had begun to receive solicitations to
consult with groups from the political "right" and "far-right," apparently hoping to
explore the use of self-confrontation methods to advance their own political aims
(S. Ball-Rokeach, personal communication, June 15, 2017). Read in this light, the
final chapter on "Ethical Implications" in The Great American Values Test can be
seen not only as a reflection on the ethics of self-confrontation in general, but as an
assertion of the authors' unwillingness to aid efforts which ran counter to their own
values and progressive vision of social change. Sandra Ball-Rokeach (personal
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communication, June 15, 2017) later recalled their particular worry that right-wing
political groups might seek to include "fake data" in their self-confrontation
prompts, seeking to affect value change on the basis of misinformation. Thus, the
shift in tone observed in this work seems primarily attributable to concerns that
self-confrontation might be used by politicians or activists without regard to
Rokeach's ethical criteria.
The study's authors were not alone in remarking on the dangers that their
research might forewarn. Indeed, the increasing interest in Rokeach's work in the
realms of politics and mass media seem to have exposed it to qualitatively different
kinds of discourse. In the social psychology realm, Rokeach's critics or would-be
critics were mostly concerned with research designs that relied on such elements as
deception and manipulation, and he had been able to clearly differentiate his work
from the targets of these attacks. But whereas ethical questions surrounding
Rokeach's previous uses of self-confrontation seem to have raised few eyebrows,
popular and scholarly reviews for The Great American Values Test repeatedly
follow the authors in emphasizing the "disturbing" character of the research
findings (e.g. Kidder, 1984; Wright, 1986). While there was relatively little public
fear or discourse about the ways that paper-and-pencil tests could affect peoples'
values or political attitudes, the idea that television could be a medium for changing
the nation's view of the world was apparently already salient to the public
imagination. In this context, the study's reception was shaped by fears of political
propaganda and other already-familiar concerns about the media's influence concerns which appear to have raised fewer eyebrows among the authors’ more
laboratory-oriented social psychologist colleagues, despite Rokeach’s own care in
seeking to distinguish his methods from attitudinally-oriented propaganda
techniques.
Conclusion
Whereas earlier psychologists had written enthusiastically about the potential that
inquiry into values might have as a tool for affecting social change, Milton Rokeach
stood out among his predecessors and contemporaries by providing a sophisticated
theoretical and methodological framework for making this program of research a
reality. This framework promised to strike at the very roots of social problems by
shaping the values which underlay the cultural crisis of the 1960s, 70s, and beyond,
all while seeking to avoid persuasion, coercion or methods that smacked of
totalitarian control. Rather, it was conceptualized as affecting change by
facilitating self-confrontation, allowing individuals to grow towards greater
internal consistency and self-awareness in the process of motivating social change
and strengthening democracy.
Rokeach's initial optimism about the promise of a psychology of values
would be tempered over time. Although he developed and applied techniques for
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affecting value change, plausibly contributing to social change in small ways, some
of his grander research aspirations raised concerns that were too troubling for
investigations to probe further. A critical assumption for Rokeach’s research
program was that the self-confrontation method was intrinsically suited to the
promotion of democratic values, while contrary values could not be facilitated by
that process. By at least the early 1980s, however, a number of circumstances
began to shed doubt on the safety of this assumption – not least of which was the
interest in Rokeach’s technology of value change expressed by political groups
whose own values conflicted with the psychologist’s. Rokeach's humanism and
social concern - characteristics which helped to impel him towards the study of
values - would ultimately also place limitations on how far he was willing to go
with that study. While Rokeach took great pains to evade the ethical pitfalls which
plagued his colleagues in constructing his approach to the experimental study and
modification of human values, these steps failed to prepare him for the kinds of
concerns that would be raised in a mass context outside of applied psychology's
traditional scope.
Though he attracted numerous students and colleagues to this pursuit during
his lifetime, values would never come to occupy the central role in social
psychology that Rokeach had hoped they would. Indeed, the social psychological
"crisis" of the late 1960s and '70s seems to have concluded without any of the
sweeping reorientations called for by its discussants becoming actualized (Faye,
2011). Rokeach seems early on to have recognized the possibility that his value
research might never have the unifying effect on social psychology that he
imagined at his most optimistic. In preparatory notes for his 1969 speech on the
state of the field, he wrote "I do not at the present see the likelihood of synthesis of
all the work in social [psychology]. Most realistic is to expect more sophisticated
little theories and more social relevance, rather than more sophisticated big theories
with little social relevance" (Rokeach, 1969b, p. 7). Although his theoretical
conceptualization of values has had a tremendous and lasting influence on the way
that values are studied by psychologists today, that statement perhaps best
anticipated the finite but measurable impact that his work would have on society
and psychologists' ongoing effort to understand values in relation to ourselves and
to science.
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